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BEYOND GAULT AND WHITTINGTON-
THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS?
THOMAS R. SPENCER, JR.*
Today we seek a way out of the difficulties of criminal law and
criminal procedure by developing preventive justice and preven-
tive methods of social control.'
But the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not
an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Willard had been reported missing by some of her relatives on
the afternoon of July 29, 1966, in the village of Baltimore in Fairfield
County, Ohio.' Buddy Whittington, an only child and fourteen years old,
had joined the search. Mr. Willard, who had quarreled consistently with
his wife during the past two years, last saw her at 6:00 a.m. Neighbors
had seen her in her yard at about 7:30 a.m. Buddy said he had seen her
at about 8:00 a.m. when she came to the rear door to return some hair
curlers to his mother. As the search continued on into the evening, the
villagers checked their own homes. Finally, at 8:00 p.m. Buddy and his
father found Mrs. Willard's body in their home, under the bed in Buddy's
bedroom. She had been strangled.'
Law enforcement officials and the probation officer of the juvenile
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. Pound, The Juvenile Court in the Service State (1944), reprinted in 10 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 516, 520 (1964).
2. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
3. The statement of facts is summarized from the Brief for Petitioner at 3-22, In re
Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968) and In re Whittington, 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d
333 (1967).
4. Id. at 3.
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court interrogated Buddy Lynn Whittington at his home, at which time
he denied any knowledge of how Mrs. Willard's body got under his bed
or the cause of her death.
On August 5, 1966, a complaint was filed in the juvenile court alleging
that Buddy was a delinquent child by virtue of murdering Mrs. Willard.
He was arrested, and since there was no juvenile detention facility in
Fairfield County he was imprisoned in solitary confinement in a cell in
the county jail. Buddy's lawyers attempted to have him released on bond
pending the hearing or to have him transferred to a juvenile detention
home in a nearby county. Although many witnesses testified that there
would be no risk to the community if Buddy were released, this motion
was denied.5
The hearing to adjudicate the delinquency charge was held Septem-
ber 2, 1966. Several motions challenging the proceeding under various
provisions of the Federal Constitution were denied.6 In subtance, the case
against Buddy consisted of the fact that Mrs. Willard's body was found
under his bed, together with circumstances, opinion testimony, and his
statements under interrogation, by which the state sought to raise the
inference that he was the last person to see her alive. At the close of the
state's case, the defense moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
prove the charge. The motion was overruled:
The Court finds that there has been a crime committed here, that
there has been a homicide committed on this alleged victim; and
the Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that this
young defendant may have done this act, which, if done by an
adult, would be a felony.7
Buddy was adjudicated a delinquent child and ordered committed
for examination. Thereafter, he was returned from the Juvenile Diag-
nostic Center and again imprisoned in the Fairfield County jail.
After seventy-eight days of solitary confinement, the district court
of appeals held that the jail was an illegal place of confinement, but
overruled the motion for bond or release to his parent. He was trans-
ferred to the detention facility of another county. On January 3, 1967,
the district court of appeals affirmed the judgment of delinquency, hold-
ing that "the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, being applicable only to the rights of accused persons charged with
criminal offenses, do not apply." With regard to the quantum of proof
required, the court held that:
5. Id. at 6.
6. These motions included: (1) a motion for dismissal because of a denial of Buddy's
right to pre-hearing release; (2) a motion to suppress all evidence derived by interrogation
without warning as to his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, and (3)
a motion to dismiss because of the unconstitutionality of the Ohio Juvenile Code in
authorizing the same judge to both investigate and try the case on the merits. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 20. See In re Whittington, 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, -, 233 N.E.2d 333, 338 (1967).
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The proceeding being civil in nature and not criminal, a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is sufficient to warrant a determina-
tion that a minor is a delinquent, even though such determina-
tion involves a finding that a criminal statute has been violated
by such minor.8
The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal for lack of any sub-
stantial constitutional question.' Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United 'States was granted.' ° On May 20, 1968, the Supreme Court"
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court of
appeals for consideration in light of In re Gault.1
2
Buddy Whittington's plight, the second sequel in the development
of juvenile court due process, requires the legal community once more
to re-examine the basic foundations of an ambitious, if unsuccessful, social
experiment.
Two factions, entrenched in opposite legal corners, have again pitted
humanitarianism against justice. While the juvenile court traditionalist
bellows the need for discretion and flexibility, the due process zealot de-
mands the equivalent of a criminal court. In the middle stands the child.
Alleged beneficiary of this pugilism, he receives the worst of two possible
worlds-the unfeeling monstrosity of criminal procedure and the overly
solicitous juvenile court non-procedure. In a third corner, facing away
from the contest, crouches the public. Neither knowledgeable nor finan-
cially sympathetic, the public is perhaps the cause of it all. Money makes
ideas work. The converse is also true. Since the juvenile courts' alleged
forte is effective care and rehabilitation in the place of the parent, the
public's position is contradictory to the avowed purpose. Thus, under
such conditions, and alert to the obvious prejudice of this writer, we
enter round two.
It shall be the purpose of this Comment to examine the character-
istics of juvenile crime, the fundamental basis of the juvenile court con-
cept with special reference to the Gault and Whittington problems, and
to conclude with the perhaps idealistic analysis that the two factions
should shake hands and consolidate their respective ideas and energies.
II. CONTOURS OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM
Juvenile crime presents one of the most challenging domestic prob-
lems presently facing this country. In the United States today, one boy
8. Id. at 21. 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, -, 233 N.E.2d 333 at 341.
9. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
10. In re Whittington, 389 U.S. 819 (1967).
11. In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968). The Court evaded the decision of any
of the crucial issues asserted by the Petitioner. Nevertheless, because the problems are so
important the case will be used as a factual and legal springboard.
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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in six is referred to the juvenilecourt. In 1965, 30 per cent of all those
arrested for non-traffic offenses were under 21 years of age, and approxi-
mately 20 percent were under 18 years of age.
13
The highest arrest rates were attributed to the 15 to 17 age group,
with the next highest for those aged 18 through 20. The 11- to 17-year-
old age group, representing 13.2 percent of the population, was attributed
with 50 percent of the arrests for burglary, larceny and motor vehicle
theft. That age group was also responsible for 8.4 percent of arrests for
willful homicide, 19.8 percent of forcible rape, 28 percent of robbery,
and 14.2 percent of the aggravated assault. Between 1960 and 1965,
arrests for persons under 18 years of age rose 52 percent for willful homi-
cide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, burglary, and auto theft.
However, the commission of "adult" crimes is but a portion of the juvenile
problem. Misconduct is also prevalent in truancy, association with deviant
personalities, ungovernable behavior, and the like. While the greatest de-
linquency problems appear to be concentrated in urban areas, suburbs
and rural areas are, respectively, second and last in the crime quanta
distribution. 4
Moreover, delinquents are predominately male. Four times as many
boys were referred to juvenile court than girls, and as might be expected,
the type of conduct which brings the child to the attention of police
authorities varies with the sex of the child. Boys were referred to court
primarily for larceny, burglary and motor vehicle theft. Girls were taken
into custody primarily for running away, ungovernable behavior, larceny
and sex offenses.
The delinquent child often comes from a broken home. He does
poorly in school and usually emerges from a background of social and
economic deprivation. This is demonstrated by the relationship between
the slums of large cities and the incidence of delinquency. Accordingly,
negroes account for a disproportionate number of arrests. 5
Numerous and sometimes conflicting theories have been advanced
for the causes of delinquency. The proposition is generally accepted,
however, that children learn to become delinquent by becoming mem-
bers of groups in which delinquent behavior is accepted. 6 Criminal be-
havior is learned in interaction with others, principally in intimate per-
sonal groups:
13. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967).
14. Id. at 56.
15. Id. at 57.
16. See H. L. WILENSKY AND C. N. LEBEAUX, INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
(1958); MIDDLE-CLASS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (E.W. Vaz ed. 1967); See also the excellent
papers presented in the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmUNsTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967).
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Whether a person's motives and drives are criminal or non-
criminal is a function of whether the legal codes have been de-
fined by those around him in a manner favorable to their
observance or to their violation.' 7
Although additional biological causes contribute to a great amount of
delinquency,' research indicates that there is a clear relationship be-
tween failure in school and the factors which contribute to juvenile mis-
conduct.1"
In light of all this, it is obvious that the awesome social problems
which produce delinquency must be identified and eliminated. The juve-
nile courts must be so well constructed that, while sanctioning misconduct,
they somehow prevent further deviant behavior. Unfortunately, the past
has demonstrated a greater ability of the courts to sanction than to pre-
vent delinquency. The interest of society in the great numbers of children
brought before the court and the current breakdown of the family unit
forces the juvenile court to assume the posture of policeman, parent, and
psychologist. Yet, it must also "perform functions essentially similar to
those exercised by any court adjudicating cases of persons charged with
dangerous and disturbing behavior."2
It is the interest of society in the child and the interest of society
in its own safety which hang in the balance. As juvenile crime increases,
the indulgence of the society must naturally decrease proportionately,
and the original concept of the juvenile court as a social force must neces-
sarily change with contemporary needs. As society views the court's
process more as a sanction essentially similar to that imposed on adult
deviants, the original understanding of the court as a solely therapeutic
device requires re-examination.
III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The theory that the state has the power to care for children within
its geographical jurisdiction is of ancient origin. In feudal times in Eng-
land the Crown supervised the estates of minors through the inquisitio
post mortem, in order to benefit from the fruits of tenure and livery to
the overlord. This was replaced in the time of Henry VIII2 by the Court
of Wards and Liveries which continued to exercise jurisdiction until 1660.
At that time, when the feudal system had become outdated, the jurisdic-
tion of the court was transferred to the Court of Chancery. Through this
court, the King, as parens patriae, assumed the general protection not
17. Glaser, The Sociological Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 683, 689 (1958).
18. See Fox, Delinquency and Biology, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 65 (1961).
19. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 71 (1967).
20. Id. at 81, quoting from ALILEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53 (1964).
21. 33 Hen. VIII, c. 22 (1541).
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only of infant tenants but of all infants in the realm, through the chan-
cellor. 2
The doctrine that the state was parens patriae of the people who
compose it, for the purpose of the care, protection, discipline and reform
of its citizenship, became an integral part of the British government and
jurisprudence in the courts of equity and thus passed to this country upon
the establishment of courts of law and equity in the various states.23
Motivated by disgust with a history in which the juvenile was treated
as any common criminal, the enlightened American reformers recognized
the need to make a distinction. Psychologists had learned that the effec-
tiveness of rehabilitation decreased proportionately with the age of the
individual.2 4 This premise, along with the adverse reaction to the treat-
ment of children as criminals, impelled the formulation of the juvenile
court system. Proceedings involving juveniles were henceforth to be non-
criminal in nature in order to save the child from the brand of criminality,
to take him in hand and, rather than first stigmatizing and then reform-
ing him, to protect him from stigma. Proceedings were to be brought to
have a guardian or the state look after the child, with the state interven-
ing between the natural parent and the child because the child needed
it, as evidenced by some of his acts, and because the parent was either
unwilling or unable to train the child properly. 5 The essential question
before the court was not what the child did, but what he was, how he got
that way, and what would be the best course of action in his interest and
in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.
At first, separate systems were provided for juveniles.2 6 Then, in
1899, the first juvenile court was created in Chicago, combining basic
equity jurisdiction with the following concept:
The fundamental idea of the [juvenile court] law is that the
state must step in and exercise guardianship over a child under
such adverse social or individual conditions as develop crime.
. * It proposes a plan whereby he may be treated, not as a
criminal, or legally charged with crime, but as a ward of the
state, to receive practically the same custody and discipline that
22. Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 Peere Williams 103, Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
23. Ex parte Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115,
145 P. 871 (1915).
24. See Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1939) wherein the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated of the State House of Refuge:
The object . . . is reformation, by training the inmates to industry; by imbuing
their minds with principles of morality and religion; by furnishing them with a
means to earn a living; and above all, by separating them from the corrupting
influence of improper associates.
25. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).
26. In 1841, Massachusetts established a probation system for juveniles, using re-
habilitation instead of punishment. Thereafter, that state provided separate hearings and
transportation for juveniles. In 1892, New York established separate trials, dockets, and
records for children under the age of sixteen. P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE OFFENDERS 555 (1949).
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are accorded the neglected and dependent child, which, as the
act states, "shall approximate as nearly as may be, that which
should be given by its parents."2
With its basic equity jurisdiction, the juvenile court was to have five
characteristics: (1) it was to be procedurally informal; (2) it was to be
remedial and not punitive; (3) it was to act preventively in advance of
the commission of any specific wrongdoing; (4) it was to employ ad-
ministrative rather than adversary methods, and (5) it was to adapt to
the circumstances of individualization.2 8
Whenever arguments questioning the constitutionality of the juvenile
court system were advanced, the answer was, in one form or another, the
same. The juvenile court was not a criminal court, and therefore criminal
due process did not apply. 9 A juvenile court hearing was not considered
a criminal trial.8" The juvenile delinquent was not a criminal." Juvenile
delinquency was not a crime. 32 A finding of a condition of juvenile de-
linquency was not a conviction, 3 nor was a commitment to a juvenile
correctional institution a sentence to punishment.3 4 So the syllogism went,
ad infinitum.
It soon became more than apparent, however, that the ambitions of
the juvenile court exceeded its realizations.35 Through no fault of the
advocates of the system nor the majority of its administrators, major
foundations of the structure disintegrated. For example, the advocates
could not control the fact that the American public regards juvenile de-
linquents as no more than young criminals.36 The stigma which the court
sought to obliterate was inescapable. Neither could the juvenile court
judges be blamed for the fact that the public refused to foot the bill for
workable child care centers. 7 Hence, the value of the system became
questionable.
27. Pound, The Juvenile Court and the Law (1944), reprinted in CRIME & DELINQUENCY
490, 498 (1964).
28. Id. at 499.
29. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
30. In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Childress v. State, 133 Tenn.
121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915).
31. Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (1941).
32. Wade v. Warden, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128 (1950).
33. In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871 (1915).
34. Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931).
35. See, e.g., Antieau, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
387 (1961); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 97 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547
(1957) ; Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another
Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (1966).
36. In re Mikkelson, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1964); In re Contreras,
241 P.2d 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
37. NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION, TASE FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRIME 13, 36-37 (1967), PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80-81 (1967).
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Gradually, other contradictions began to emerge. While refusing to
label the adjudication of the juvenile a criminal conviction, the result
seemed to be the same. The public's economic apathy turned the dream
into a nightmare, and juvenile facilities became no more than jails, and
no less the festering places for the psychological sores of children.38
Further, it was clear that the majority of alleged juvenile delinquents
brought before the court were charged with violations of law. The fact-
finding process in the criminal court was relatively sophisticated, but
what was supposedly its parallel in the juvenile court was incredible.
Using the preponderance of the evidence test,39 some courts allowed
hearsay testimony,4 ° disallowed confrontation and cross-examination,41
and in many instances did not require formal notice of the charges.42
Thus, a child charged with a felony was adjudicated a delinquent with the
same informality as a child charged with truancy.
Spurred by rumors and concrete examples of abuses,43 lawyers began
clamoring for much more law and much less equity in the juvenile courts."
Finally, the inevitable argument against the juvenile court was waged. If
38. FREED AND WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON BAIL AND CRnrmNAL JUSTICE 105 (1964): "With few notable exceptions, juvenile detention
facilities have been characterized as a 'national disgrace.'"
39. Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932).
40. See In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 606, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954):
• ..from the very nature of the hearings in the Juvenile Court it cannot be re-
quired that strict rules of evidence should be applied as they properly would be in
the trial of cases in the criminal court. Although, of course, a finding of delinquency
must be based upon sufficient competent evidence . . .hearsay evidence, if it is
admitted without objection and is relevant and material to the issue, is to be given
its natural probative effect and may be received as direct evidence....
But see the dissenting opinion of Musmanno, J.:
In justification of this incredible procedure, the Majority ...says that it is proper
to receive hearsay when it is admitted without objection. What did Joseph Holmes
know about objections? He is a minor. He had no lawyer to represent him. No one
informed him as to his rights. He was not told he could object. A child in a court-
room amid a throng of police officers, probation officers, court attendants, and
other officials, with a judge officiating from a podium, is not apt to summon the
brashness, even if he possessed the knowledge, to lift his voice and cry out that
what a police officer testified to was hearsay, even if he knew what hearsay meant.
Id. at 619, 109 A.2d at 532. See also In re Mantell, 157 Neb 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954)
(finding may not rest upon hearsay); Williams v. Rhay, 73 Wash. Dec.2d 775, 440 P.2d 427
(1968) (Hearsay evidence in the form of juvenile and police reports admissible for the
purposes of a transfer hearing) ; State v. Piche, 442 P.2d 632 (Wash. 1968).
41. See, for example, the procedure used in Gault, note 48 infra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Freestone v. State, 98 Ind. App. 523, 176 N.E. 877 (1931).
43. See for example, the biting charge made by Starrs, A Sense of Irony in Southern
Juvenile Courts, 1 PORTIA L. J. 107 (1966):
[Tihe civil rights movement has taught us that the juvenile court, like other legal
processes in the South, may be no more than another strong arm of segregation.
It can, when it wishes, intimidate civil rights demonstrators and their parents by
long periods of inhuman confinement without recourse to bail. It can, at its whim,
force them to sell their constitutional birthright in return for their release ...And
it can, in ominous tones, threaten to invoke its continuing jurisdiction to recall and
redetermine the case of any juvenile upon his breach of elaborate and obscure pro-
bationary conditions.
44. See note 35 supra.
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the juvenile court was not supplying the positive benefits it claimed to
possess, the rationale for its continued existence disappeared.45
It had been argued that the state could withhold traditional due
process from the child in return for providing care instead of punishment,
a sort of quid pro quo. But it became obvious that the child's part of the
bargain saw a definite failure of consideration:
There is evidence.., that there may be grounds for concern that
the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.46
In addition, the possibility of resultant confinement supplied an
underlying rationale to afford a child due process of law.47 Short of total
obliteration, fundamental rights had to be injected into the juvenile court
process. This order was finally expressed, if not fully delineated, in the
decision of In re Gault.48
IV. IN RE GAULT AND ITS PROGENY OF PROBLEMS
The Gault decision, like the Whittington case, arose out of an in-
credible factual situation. Gerald Gault was taken into custody by the
sheriff of Gila County, Arizona, on June 8, 1964, and was charged with
uttering indecent language over the telephone. At the time of his arrest,
his parents were not notified of his arrest or detention. A probation officer
filed a petition merely alleging in general language, without supportive
factual allegations, that Gerald was delinquent. No copy of the petition
was served on the parents.
At the hearing on June 9, 1964, the prosecuting witness was absent.
No transcription of the proceedings was made, nor were Gerald or his
parents told that he had a right to counsel or a right to remain silent.
45. A typical statement is found in State v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 223, 416 P.2d 259,
269 (1966):
The validity of the whole juvenile system is dependent upon its adherence to its
protective, rather than its penal, aspects. Dispensing with formal constitutional safe-
guards can be justified only so long as the proceedings are not, in any sense, crimi-
nal. We hold confinement in a penal institution will convert the proceedings from
juvenile to criminal and require the observance of constitutional safeguards ....
If after a juvenile proceeding, the juvenile can be committed to a place of penal
servitude, the entire claim of parens patriae becomes a hypocritical mockery.
See also In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
46. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
47. In United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the Court stated:
Precious constitutional rights cannot be diminished or whittled away by the device
of changing names of tribunals or modifying the nomenclature of legal proceedings.
The test must be the nature and the essence of the proceeding rather than its title. If
the result may be a loss of personal liberty, the constitutional safeguards apply.
See also Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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A further hearing was held on June 15th at which the complaining
witness was again absent. After consulting the probation officer's "re-
ferral report," a document which was not disclosed to Gerald or his
parents, the judge adjudicated Gerald a juvenile delinquent and com-
mitted him to the State Industrial School for the period of his minority
(a possible period of six years). If Gerald had been an adult, he would
have been subject to the possibility of a fine of five to fifty dollars or
imprisonment for not more than two months.
Because under Arizona law no appeal was permitted, a writ of
habeas corpus was filed in the Supreme Court of Arizona. That court
referred the matter for hearing to a lower court which dismissed the
writ. The dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona.
On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States addressed itself to
six problems: (1) notice of the charges; (2) right to counsel; (3) right
to confrontation and cross-examination; (4) privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; (5) right to a transcript of the proceedings, and (6) the right to
appellate review. The Court, however, declined to rule on the last two
issues.
Throughout the opinion runs the thread of the Court's discontent
with the present achievement of juvenile court objectives, and three
main points seemed paramount. First, even though the child was merely
adjudicated delinquent, he was charged with misconduct, the result of
which might be incarceration. A majority of the Court saw no difference
between incarceration in an "industrial school" and in an adult prison.4"
Second, high crime rates and a great deal of recidivism highlighted the
failure of the system to correct the anti-social conduct of juveniles.'
Finally, the Court refused to accept the argument that informality was
a positive characteristic to be retained. Studies indicated "that the appear-
ance as well as ... the essentials of due process ... may be a more im-
pressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is con-
cerned.
151
The Court, in short, reached the conclusion that many of the alleged
benefits of the system existed in theory not in fact and, therefore, failed
to supply a sufficient basis for the denial of fundamental rights. The
Court did not, however, refuse to recognize some of the positive aspects
which actually exist:
For example, the commendable principles relating to the proc-
essing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in
no way involved or affected by the procedural issues Under the
discussion.52
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 22.
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In fact, the opinion stresses repeatedly: "... . the features of the juvenile
system . . . will not be impaired by constitutional domestication."5
Nevertheless, certain basic procedural guarantees were demanded
of the juvenile court adjudicatory process when a child is charged with
being a delinquent and faces possible confinement. Henceforth, to comply
with due process requirements of juvenile court proceedings, notice must
be given sufficiently in advance of the scheduled court proceedings so
that the child and his parents will have an opportunity to prepare a
defense. Furthermore, the petition or other notice must "set forth the
alleged misconduct with particularity.
'54
With regard to the presence of counsel, the Court noted that the
juvenile court could not adequately or constitutionally represent both
the child and the state. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to
cope with the problems of law:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine
delinquency . . . in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed,
the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to
be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are
unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child.55
Reiterating the position taken in Kent v. United States,8 the Court
also held that absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency
and an order of commitment to a state institution could not be sustained
in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for
cross-examination." Lastly, the Court concluded that "the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles
as it is with respect to adults.1
58
The effect of Gault was far greater in its implications than in the
four fundamental rights it deemed absolutely necessary. 9 The revolu-
tionary policy which the opinion evidenced has produced a jurisprudential
battle which will be resolved only through clear future statements by
53. Id.
54. Id. at 33. See also Ex Parte DeGrace, - Mo.-, 425 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Kan. City Ct.
App. 1968).
55. Id. at 41.
56. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
57. 387 U.S. at 57.
58. Id. at 55.
59. For other recent articles dealing with the effect of the Gault decision, see Frey,
The Effect of the Gault Decision on the Iowa Juvenile Justice System, 17 DRAKE L. Rxv.
53 (1967); Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811 (1967);
Comment, Juvenile Justice in Transition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1144 (1967); Comment,
In re Gault: Children Are People, 55 CAILiF. L. REV. 1204 (1967). For an excellent empirical
study on the application of the Gault decision on Florida juvenile courts, see Note, Delin-
quency and Denied Rights in Florida's Juvenile Court System, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 369 (1968).
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the Court. Since the Court refused to characterize the proceedings as
either civil or criminal, the juvenile court remains in definitional limbo.
Consequently, a number of problems arise simply because of the failure
to label the process. The purpose of this Comment is to present and
examine a few of those problems.
A. Gault-Retrospective or Prospective
A central issue being judicially debated today in a number of juris-
dictions is whether the rights guaranteed by the Gault decision should be
given retroactive effect. The Court's ability to apply a decision retro-
spectively is well-settled:
[W] e are neither required to apply nor prohibited from apply-
ing a decision retrospectively. We must then weigh the merits
and [diversity] in each case by looking to the prior history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retro-
spective operation will further or retard its operation."
The decision of Gideon v. Wainwright6 was impliedly held retro-
active in Doughty v. Maxwell,6 2 where the Court reversed a conviction
entered prior to the pronouncement in Gideon because the indigent ac-
cused had not been provided with counsel. Later, Jackson v. Denno63
was applied retroactively in McNerlin v. Denno.
64
Yet, in recent years, retroactive application of decisions has been
conspicuously absent. For example, in Linkletter v. Walker,65 the Court
denied retroactive application to the exclusionary rule announced in
Mapp v. Ohio.66 Subsequently, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,67
the Court declined to retrospectively apply the right of a defendant to
have the prosecution refrain from commenting on his failure to testify. 8
In Johnson v. New Jersey69 the Court noted that the choice between
retroactivity and non-retroactivity in no way turns upon the "value of
the constitutional guarantee involved."'7 The reliance on existing law 'and
the impact on the administration of justice were announced as controlling
60. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of
an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962), Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L. J.
907 (1962).
61. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
62. 376 U.S. 202 (1963).
63. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
64. 378 U.S. 575 (1963).
65. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
66. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
67. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
68. Announced in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
69. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
70. "We also stress that the retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not auto-
matically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based."
384 U.S. at 728.
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factors in determining retroactivity or non-retroactivity. The Court
realized that retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda would
seriously disrupt the administration of criminal laws. "It would require
the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy
evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional stan-
dards."'
Finally, the Court summarized the rules of Johnson, Tehan and
Linkletter by setting forth in Stovall v. Denno72 the following criteria for
determining whether a decision should be given retroactive or only pro-
spective effect: (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (b)
the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retro-
active application of the new standards." When these criteria are applied
to the Gault decision, it appears that it should not be given retroactive
application.
With regard to the first criterion, the purpose served by the Gault
decision is demonstrated by the Court's concern for clear procedural
guidelines to determine a juvenile's status. The second criterion is, how-
ever, a more important consideration. The majority of states assumed
before Gault that juvenile court laws, reflecting the parens patriae concept
of juvenile justice, were constitutionally adequate. The practical effect
of the Gault decision was to drastically change the juvenile court struc-
ture, with a resultant burden on the judicial process.
The last factor, however, provides the most important basis for not
applying the decision retroactively. In Stovall v. Denno74 the court noted
the basis upon which Griffin v. California75 had not been applied retro-
actively: 76
To require all of those states now to void the conviction of
every person who did not testify at his trial would have an im-
pact upon the administration of their criminal law so devastat-
ing as to need no elaboration.
Application of Gault retroactively would have the same devastating
impact on the states. All adjudications of delinquency, where the child
was not advised of his right to court appointed counsel, would be void.
Rehearings would be demanded in state judicial systems which are already
choked with litigation. Such hearings would be rendered ineffective by
71. Johnson v. New Jersey, 348 U.S. at 731. See Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964
Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ and Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Comment, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in
Escobedo, 64 MicH. L. REv. 832 (1966).
72. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
73. Id. at 297.
74. Id. at 293.
75. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
76. Quoting from Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966).
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"the unavailability of witnesses, by dim memories, and by the inadequacy
or unavailability of juvenile court records.""
Courts which have analyzed the decisions culminating in Stovall
have denied retroactive application.7" Other courts have simply held the
decision retroactive,79 while others have compared the right to counsel
in Gault with the same right, applied retroactively in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,s° and have reached the same result of retroactive application."'
However, the situations in Gault and Gideon are distinguishable. When
Gideon was decided, the states were forewarned of the outcome and many
states had actually advocated the Court's decision. The mere fact that
both concerned the right to counsel is not the controlling factor, as the
Court carefully explained in Johnson v. New Jersey."s In fact, as pre-
viously noted, not even the particular amendment involved in the decision
is controlling. Rather, the impact on the administration of justice seems
to be the controlling consideration. It is clear that the Gault case will
affect many more than the six states affected by the Tehans3 decision and
the majority of the states affected by the Johnson decision. Indeed, the
Gault decision is comparable in effect to the Stovall decision and there-
fore compels the same standard of non-retroactivity.
B. A Right to Counsel in Non-Delinquency Proceedings
Although the Court in Gault was clear in requiring counsel in de-
linquency hearings, no statement was made as to the other half of the
juvenile court business-"neglect," "dependency," and "child in need
of supervision" proceedings. The premise of the Court's application of
the right to counsel turned on the fact that the delinquency proceeding
carries with it "the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institu-
77. Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967) (holding Gault not retro-
active).
78. In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156
S.E.2d 874 (1967); Rieck v. Hershman, 35 U.S.L.W. 2754 (Wis. Waukesha Cty. Ct., June 1,
1967). See also the excellent analysis of this problem by Barns, J. in Sult v. Weber, 210 So.2d
739 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968):
Gault clearly recognized that the standards therein stated were not merely newly
discovered constitutional rights, but were newly extended applications of new
constitutional standards to a system of courts unknown to the common law which
are sui generis in nature.
Id. at 746.
79. Marsden v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 564, 227 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1967); LaFollette v.
Circuit Court, 37 Wis. 2d 329, 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967). See also Gogley v. Peyton, 160
S.E.2d 746 (Va. 1968).
80. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81. State ex rel. Milton v. Richardson, 28 Fla. Supp. 189 (Cir. Ct. Dade County 1967).
82. 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966)
83. In Stovall v. Denno, the court remarked:
In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra, we thought it persuasive against
retroactive application of the no-comment rule of Griffin v. State of California ...
that such application would have a serious impact on the six states that allowed
comment on an accused's failure to take the stand. 382 U.S. at 419 (1966).
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tion until the juvenile reaches the age of 21 .;)8 Yet in a state such as
Florida, a child may be committed to an institution as a dependent for
the term of his minority.8 5 If the rationale of the Court is at all consistent,
the same right to counsel should apply, since the same incarceration may
result. Other courts have followed this logic in other similar proceedings.
In People v. Potter,8 for example, a court held that in a proceeding to
determine whether or not a person is insane, the right to counsel should
be afforded. Federal courts have similarly demanded that in a proceeding
which may result in the commitment of a person thought to be insane,
the defendant has a constitutional right to counsel.8 7 Some state courts
have applied the safeguard to proceedings solely aimed at determining
dependency.8
One could, however, argue that the Court in Gault, aside from the
deprivation of liberty, was also impressed with the resultant stigma which
attached to a child adjudicated a delinquent.8" This is distinguishable
from the attitude society has for children in some manner dependent on
its care.90 The lack of a negative stigma might induce hesitation to apply
the right to counsel. This view was recently expressed in In re Urbasek:
Dependency and neglect cases are ordinarily instituted primarily
because of the unwillingness or inability of parents or relatives
84. 387 U.S. at 36.
85. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(2) (c) (1967). As a practical matter, this occurs rarely.
86. 85 Ill. App. 2d 151, 228 N.E.2d 238 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The Court relied upon
Gault for the proposition that whether the proceeding is called civil or criminal the end
result is incarceration and the right to counsel must be applied. See also Baxstrom v. Harold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) wherein the Court, refer-
ring to a sex offender statute, noted at 608:
The commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are subject
both to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and to the
Due Process Clause.
Florida, by statute applies a privilege to counsel to insanity hearings. FLA. STAT. '§ 394.22(4)
(1967).
87. Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
88. See in re McCoy, 184 Kan. 1, 334 P.2d 820 (1959) (KAN. GEN. STAT. 38-80 (1954));
In re Palmer, 212 A.2d 61 (R.I. 1965) (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-30 (1956)).
89. "It is disconcerting . . . that this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma
than the term 'criminal' applied to adults." 387 U.S. at 24. See also Winburn v. State, 32
Wis. 2d 152, 162, 145 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1966) wherein the court stated:
Despite all protestations to the contrary, the adjudication of delinquency carries
with it a social stigma. This court can take judicial notice that in common parlance,
'juvenile delinquent' is a term of opprobrium and is not society's accolade bestowed
on the successfully rehabilitated.
See also People v. Welchel, 255 A.C.A. 550, 63 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1967).
90. One experienced author, Judge Orman Ketcham of the Juvenile Court of the
District of Columbia, has stated:
Repeatedly, the Court stated two basic limitations to its mandate: the specific
rights guaranteed by Gault must be afforded only when (1) the proceedings entails
the determination of delinquency as a result of alleged misconduct, and (2) the
result of the proceedings may be commitment to an institution in which the juve-
nile's freedom may be curtailed. Thus, neglect and dependency proceedings are
clearly not within the ambit of the decision.
Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault, 53 U. VA. L. REV. 1700, 1706-7 (1968).
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to discharge their parental duties rather than because of the
child's misconductY1
On the other hand, severing the child from its parents might be of
sufficient seriousness to compel the same right to counsel guaranteed in
Gault. Furthermore, the child who is presumed incompetent for many
other purposes might be in the same practical situation as the insane
individual. Consistency of both logic and public policy seem to compel
the same procedural safeguard in the case of the dependent infant when
faced with the possibility of incarceration in a state school.
C. Equality of Appellate Review
It has been thought well-settled that an appeal is not a matter of
right but a matter of grace, and the failure of a state legislature to provide
for an appeal from a juvenile court is not unconstitutional. 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States has recognized that when an appeal is pro-
vided, it may be accorded by the state upon such terms and conditions
as in its wisdom it deems proper. 9"
However, if a state does grant a right of appeal to persons accused
of crimes, it must make that right equally available to indigents. 4 Must
the state also make that right equally available to juveniles charged
with delinquency based upon a violation of law? Is it a denial of the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment
to deny a juvenile a "first" appeal when criminal defendants are afforded
such by a state? Moreover, when an appeal is provided for juveniles but
the time to perfect the appeal is less than that afforded to criminal de-
fendants, does this amount to an "invidious discrimination?"
The guaranty of the fourteenth amendment is that all persons simi-
larly situated must be dealt with and treated on an equal basis. A state
may classify persons according to their peculiar circumstances as long
as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary."' An argument could
be made that juveniles charged in juvenile court with a violation of law
are "similarly situated" with criminal defendants. When charged with a
violation of law, the determination in the fact finding process, or ad-
judicative stage, is whether or not the child did the act which resulted
91. 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1967). However, it should be noted that in
Illinois the dependent child cannot be committed to an institution designed solely for the
care of delinquent children. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, par. 705-7(1) (e) (1965).
92. In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209
Iowa 813, 227 N.W. 136 (1929). It should be noted that the Supreme Court declined to
rule on this issue in Gault, 387 U.S. at 58.
93. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); Mooneyham v. Kansas, 339 F.2d 209
(10th Cir. 1964).
94. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
95. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420
(1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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in the violation of law which would make him delinquent. The possible
result of a determination that he did commit the act is identical with
that of the criminal defendant-incarceration. The fact that the child is
committed to an industrial school instead of a prison was viewed as a
distinction without a difference by the Court in Gault:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
"receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an
institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for
a greater or lesser time.
96
Therefore, since the child is similarly situated with criminal de-
fendants in both the substance and goal of the proceedings, the child
should have the same right to appeal and, if an appeal is granted, the
same time to perfect an appeal as criminal defendants. To grant anything
less would be discriminatory. The rationale of Griffin v. Illinois7 and
Douglas v. California,"8 the advocate could argue, obtains with no less
force with respect to juveniles. The purpose there was to avoid an in-
vidious discrimination based on economic status. Here, the object is to
avoid a discrimination based on age.
On the other hand, one who analyzed the situation from the opposite
point of view would no doubt place great emphasis on the reluctance of
the Gault decision to characterize the juvenile court proceedings. In the
absence of a criminal label, the advocate could revert to the old parens
patriae concept, evidencing an entirely different approach to the juvenile.
The child, the arguer could advance, is in no manner "similarly situated"
with the criminal defendant. He is the object of the state's solicitude, not
its approbation. He is not charged with a violation of law. Rather, it is
his status which is being investigated. The result is not incarceration.
On the contrary, an industrial school is designed for rehabilitation, not
retribution. Admitting all this, the state has the absolute right to classify
juveniles as distinct from criminals. In fact, the Supreme Court recog-
nized this when it applauded the practice of treating juveniles separately
from criminals. Many courts have upheld statutes distinguishing juveniles
and rejected attacks based on the equal protection clause. 9
96. 387 U.S. at 27.
97. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
98. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
99. See Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958) ; In re Herrara, 23
Cal. 2d 206, 143 P.2d 345 (1943) ; People v. Schering, 93 Cal. App. 2d 736, 209 P.2d 796
(1949). See also the statement of the court in Fisher v. Commonwealth, 213 Pa. 48, 51, 62
A. 198, 199 (1905):
That minors may be classified for their best interests and the public welfare has
never been questioned in the legislation relating to them. Under the Act of 1887,
the classification of females under 16 years of age means felonious rape, with its
severe penalties for what may be done in one day, though on the next it remains
simple fornication, to be expiated by a mere fine . . . The genus homo is a subject
within the meaning of the Constitution. Will it be countered that as to this there
can be no classification? No laws affecting the personal and property rights of
minors as distinguished from adults? Or of males as distinguished from females?
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Furthermore, if the appeal time is less than that afforded the crim-
inal, the legislature may have had a distinct purpose. In Florida, for ex-
ample, the time within which a juvenile may perfect an appeal is ten
days, 10 while the convicted criminal has ninety days.' 01 The legislature's
purpose, however, was to settle quickly the status of the child in order
to expedite rehabilitation.0 2 In view of this reasonable purpose, there is
no "invidious discrimination."
The resolution of this problem will depend upon the resolution of
the essential premise. If the child undergoes a "criminal" prosecution
and it is recognized as such, the child should be afforded equal treatment.
Absent this label, one cannot definitely say to what appellate procedure
the child is entitled.
D. Amendment of Petition
Assume, hypothetically, that the juvenile court judge is faced with
a runaway who is, thereby, a dependent child. A petition alleging de-
pendency is filed, and during the hearing, the child voluntarily admits
to a violation of law, i.e., that he is delinquent. Must the court now issue
a new petition? If it does not, would this be a denial of procedural due
process?
The fundamental requirement set down in Gault appears to com-
pel an affirmative answer to both queries,' 0 3 but the absence of a char-
acterizing label confuses the issue. Gault requires that the child receive
notice of the charges stated with particularity so that he and his parents
may prepare a defense. This would seemingly require the juvenile court,
under the hypothetical given above, to issue a new petition, to wait the
required time, and to hold a new hearing on the delinquency charge. In
fact, to do otherwise would be tantamount to adjudicating a person
guilty of a crime without charging him with the crime, a procedure which
has been denounced in criminal law.0 4 But what of civil law?
It may be possible for the court to amend the petition to conform
to the evidence produced at the hearing and to adjudicate the juvenile
based on the amended petition. In fact, a few older cases have condoned
this. One case, In re Bentley,10 5 approved such a practice when the peti-
100. FLA. STAT. 1 39.14(2) (1967).
101. FLA. STAT. § 924.09 (1967).
102. In re Evans, 116 So.2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
103.
Notice to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in
advance of scheduled court proceedings so that a reasonable opportunity to prepare
will be afforded, and it must 'set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.'
387 U.S. at 33.
104. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
105. 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944). See also State ex rel. Raddue v. Superior
Court, 106 Wash. 619, 180 P. 875 (1919).
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tion alleged delinquency and the child was adjudicated dependent. The
court held:
When the child is once brought before the court and the facts
are presented, the court may order the petition to be amended
and adjudge the child to be a "neglected", "dependent", or
"delinquent" child, as the facts warrant. To hold otherwise
would defeat the purpose of the law.'01
On the other hand, a more recent Mississippi case, In re Slay, 7
reached the opposite result. There the child was alleged to be a dependent,
and without amending the petition or issuing a new one, the juvenile
court had entered an order adjudicating the child a delinquent. Conclud-
ing that the child was denied due process of law, the court held that
"[i]n short, the child was never charged with being a delinquent."'
It is submitted that any reading of the intent of the Gault decision
compels a conclusion identical to that reached in Slay. The purpose of
the notice is to allow the child and his parents every opportunity to pre-
pare a defense. Juvenile court judges faced with such a situation would
do well to issue a new petition, give notice of the new charge and hold
a new hearing.
However, were there a clear statement that an adjudication of
delinquency based on a violation of law is equivalent to a criminal trial,
no discussion would appear necessary. The criminal law in this respect
is clear. Juvenile law is not.
E. Waiver of Rights
May a child waive the rights guaranteed by the Gault decision?
That the Court felt that this was a possibility is clear from its considera-
tion of whether the Gaults "did or did not choose to waive the right."'0 9
In another part of the opinion, the Court observed that:
[S]pecial problems may arise with respect to waiver of the
privilege by or on behalf of children, and there may be some
differences in technique-but not in principle-depending upon
the age of the child and the presence and competence of
parents." 0
Historically this question has been a factual one; that is, whether
or not the right was waived depends upon the facts and circumstances
106. In re Bentley, 246 Wis. 69, 80, 16 N.W.2d 390, 395 (1944).
107. 245 Miss. 294, 147 So.2d 299 (1962).
108. 245 Miss. 294, 300, 147 So.2d 299, 301 (1962). See also Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo.
217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956) wherein the court held that where the petition alleged dependency,
that was the sole determination to be made on that petition. New facts required the filing
of a new petition.
109. 387 U.S. at 42.
110. Id. at 55. See also Ex parte DeGrace, -Mo.- 425 S.W.2d 228 (Kan. City Ct.
App. 1968).
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analyzed in their totality. The federal courts have directed the trial judge
to consider the totality of circumstances in each case, including age,
education, experience and ability to comprehend the meaning and pos-
sible result of a waiver."' A California Supreme Court case, decided
after Gault, allowed waiver of the right to counsel, based upon the fore-
going factual considerations."
2
On the other hand, in many legal situations the law presumes that
an infant is unable to intelligently protect his rights. For example, a
child is presumed as a matter of law incompetent in contractual affairs."
3
In 1962, in the decision of Gallegos v. Colorado,"4 the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction based upon a confession made by a juvenile not-
withstanding the fact that he had been advised of his right to counsel.
The majority stated that a fourteen year old, no matter how sophis-
ticated, is unlikely to have any conception as to what he will be con-
fronted with. He is unable to know how to protect his own interests or
how to gain the benefits of his constitutional rights. A California court
in In re Butterfield"5 held a waiver by a fifteen-year-old juvenile ineffec-
tive, even though the juvenile and her mother were advised of the right
to counsel. The appellate court thought the waiver ineffective because it
was not made with an intelligent understanding of the consequences, a
long-term confinement.
However, the general proposition still is that a juvenile can waive
rights which are tendered to him."' The question should remain a factual
one, depending upon the total circumstances. Such an approach allows
for needed flexibility. However, in the absence of a showing in the record
that the juvenile was afforded competent, friendly adult advice, a rebut-
table presumption of the lack of an intelligent waiver should be raised.
Such a rule would provide the safeguards needed when dealing with state-
ments made by juveniles who, on the whole, are easily coerced either
111. McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This is consistent with the
statement in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) that a waiver is "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." See also In re Estrada, I
Ariz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 1 (1965).
112. People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967). But see Shioutakon v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C.
1955) ; People v. Cocroft, 37 Ill. 2d 19, 225 N.E.2d 16 (1967).
113. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (D.S.C. 1961); Mossler Ac-
ceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1950). He is also incapable to act as either
an executor or administrator. T. ATKINSON, WILLs, § 110 (1953).
114. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). The court drew upon its decision in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948), where a fifteen year old was held incapable of being judged on a level with
adults with regard to waiver.
115. 253 A.C.A. 888, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1967). In People v. Cummings, 255 A.C.A.
378, 62 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1967), the court imposed the requirement that the minor have an
understanding of the nature of the charge, elements of the offense, defenses available, or
the punishment that might be exacted as a condition precedent to waiver. See also State v.
Herbert, 106 N.H. 401, 235 A.2d 524 (1967); Ex Parte DeGrace, -Mo.-, 425 S.W.2d 228
(Kan. City Ct. App. 1968) ; Hopkins v. State, -Miss.-, 209 So.2d 841 (1968).
116. See cases collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1961).
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directly or indirectly by the situation in which they find themselves.
This would also force the states to provide a guardian ad litem imme-
diately, a procedure which seems essential to the protection of the
juvenile's rights and the integrity of the proceedings.
F. Proof of Corpus Delecti
If a child during a juvenile court hearing admits to a violation of
law which could result in an adjudication of delinquency, is the state
required to prove up the elements of the violation as in a criminal court?
Two problems immediately arise: (1) whether or not the criminal
rules of evidence apply so that proof of corpus delecti is essential; and
(2) whether or not a judicial confession, as distinct from an extra-judicial
confession, must be substantiated by proof of the elements.
With respect to the first problem, the lack of a clear label attached
to the juvenile proceeding again creates the issue. Gault did not examine
or discuss the rules of criminal evidence. Further, many of the states
apply the equity rules of evidence to the juvenile court proceedings.
117
Nevertheless, the argument could still be made that since the determina-
tion is whether or not the juvenile did the act which resulted in the
violation of law, which in turn makes him delinquent, the essential ele-
ments should be proved up as in a criminal prosecution. The purpose
of requiring proof of corpus delecti in criminal proceedings is to sub-
stantiate a confession which might be unreliable or even coerced." 8
Certainly this reasoning would apply with as much, if not greater, per-
suasion in the juvenile court.1 9
On the other hand, a major premise of the juvenile court philosophy
is that the adjudication is one of a status, not of an act. Therefore, the
rules of criminal evidence should not apply. The juvenile is presumably
in friendly surroundings and would not be prone to confess to an act
he has not committed.
Although there is a dearth of juvenile cases on this point, the
majority rule in criminal law is that extra-judicial confessions must be
corroborated. 2 ° One recent juvenile case followed this approach. In the
case of In re Houseworth121 the court, although construing the New York
Family Court Act, 22 required that a confession made by juveniles be
corroborated before it can be admitted by the court. The purpose of the
117. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2) (1967):
Hearings shall be conducted by the judge without a jury, applying the rules of
evidence in use in equity cases in the circuit courts ....
See also In re W.O., 100 N.J. Super. 358, 242 A.2d 17 (1968).
118. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE '§ 110, at p. 230 (1954).
119. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 45, 51-2 (1967).
120. See note 118 supra.
121. 53 Misc. 2d 375, 278 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1967).
122. New York Family Court Act § 744(b).
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requirement, the court indicated, is to avoid the danger that one may
confess to a crime when no crime has been committed.
A further problem, however, results from the majority rule that
while an extra-judicial confession must be corroborated, a judicial con-
fession need not be substantiated.123 Yet, it is clear that some psycho-
logical coercion must result from the conditions and trappings of the
juvenile court. The child finds himself surrounded by strangers, placed
in unusual quarters and faced with possible punishment. Under those
conditions, is not a young person likely to agree to be easily coerced?
The same fear of an unsubstantiated confession is present whether the
confession is made in court or out of court. A more reasonable approach
would be that regardless of where made, confessions by juveniles should
be corroborated by at least some evidence. However, in the absence of a
Supreme Court statement that the proceeding is criminal in nature, one
can only suggest, rather than report, the correct approach.
G. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Is a juvenile protected by the fourth amendment against unreason-
able search and seizure? At least two jurisdictions have held that he is.
In State v. Lowry124 the Superior Court of New Jersey asked:
Can a court countenance a system where, as here, an adult may
suppress evidence with the usual effect of having the charges
dropped for lack of proof, and, on the other hand, a juvenile
can be institutionalized . . . for "rehabilitative" purposes be-
cause the Fourth Amendment right is unavailable to him?
125
The court noted that the historical development of the concepts of illegal
search and seizure, from Weeks v. United States 26 to Mapp v. Ohio,27
indicates that the rule applies to all persons, whether accused of a crime
or not. Therefore, the constitutional right of privacy should be applicable
to children and adults alike. Furthermore, the doctrine of parens patriae
should require that in order to properly rehabilitate the child, official
misbehavior must not go undeterred. Respect for law and order, the goal
of the juvenile court, will be best realized if the police are required to
deal fairly and legally with juveniles. 28
123. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 839c (1961). This rule has been applied in juvenile pro-
ceedings. See In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 377 P.2d 74, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 838 (1962). The courts seem to feel that while suspicion of protracted
police interrogation compels independent proof of an extra-judicial confession, the psy-
chological impact of the court, the oath of truth, etc., compel an opposite result. J. WiG-
MORE, EVmENCE, § 842a (3d ed. 1940).
124. 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967).
125. Id. at 316, 230 A.2d at 911. See also In re Marsh, -Ill.2d-, 237 N.E.2d 529
(1968) ; In re L.B., 99 N.J. Super. 589, 240 A.2d 709 (1968).
126. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
127. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
128. See In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 210, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844, 860 (Family Ct. 1963):
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It is interesting to note that while the court in In re Williams129
recognized that proceedings in the New York Family Court are civil
and not criminal, it nevertheless held that the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures should be extended to children
charged with the doing of an act which if done by an adult would be a
crime.
V. WHITTINGTON-FOUR MORE PROBLEMS
The rumblings of the legal community following the Gault decision
had hardly subsided when Whittington appeared on the judicial horizon.
Again, as in Gault, the summary adjudication seemed based on the
flimsiest of evidence."" Again, four fundamental questions were involved:
(1) whether due process and equal protection were denied by the applica-
tion of the standard of proof by the lower courts; (2) whether a fair
and impartial trial by an impartial trier of fact-trial by jury-was
denied; (3) whether statements admitted into evidence violated the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel; and (4)
whether the right to pre-hearing release applies in a juvenile court pro-
ceeding.
Yet apart from these superficial similarities, the Whittington case
is distinguishable in one great aspect. The inequity in Gault was the six
year commitment facing a child for an offense normally punishable by a
small fine or short jail term."' In situations such as Whittington, com-
mitment to a juvenile facility seems far less a punishment than that
afforded an adult for the same criminal act." 2 Yet, any commitment is
unjust when based upon an illegal adjudication. The Court was thus
faced with, but unfortunately did not decide, the question it avoided in
Gault: Is the adjudicatory phase of a juvenile delinquency hearing, when
based upon a criminal offense, a criminal trial?
A. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
As noted above,"' the proposition had long been accepted by the
courts that a juvenile delinquency hearing was not a criminal trial.
I can think of few worse examples to set for our children than to visit upon
children what would be, if they were older, unreasonable and unconstitutional
invasions of their all-too-limited privacy and rights merely because they are young.
See also In re Boykin, -Ill. 2d-, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968).
129. 49 Misc. 2d 154, 169, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109 (Family Ct. 1966).
130. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
131. 387 U.S. at 9, 29.
132. The distinction is underlined by the dissenting voice of Justice Stewart in Gault
when, in defending the juvenile court system, he said:
So it was that a 12 year old boy named James Guild was tried in New Jersey for
killing Catharine Beakes. A jury found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced
to death by hanging. The sentence was executed. It was all very constitutional.
387 U.S. at 80, citing State v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163, 18 Am. Dec. 404 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1828).
133. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the courts concluded, the quantum of evidence necessary for




The petitioner in Whittington asserted a threshhold argument that
the lower court applied an impermissible standard of proof in basing the
adjudication on what appeared to be a "probable cause" test.1 5 However,
counsel further argued that even the preponderance of evidence test was
unconstitutional when applied to a violation of law. The result of the
adjudication was commitment to a security institution. This result im-
pelled the same evidentiary safeguards of criminal law. 136 Anything less
would be a denial of both equal protection and due process of law. 13 7
Although the majority of jurisdictions have held otherwise,' 38 the
recent case of In re Urbasek13  may be the vanguard of a trend toward
the reasonable doubt standard. In that case, an eleven-year-old boy was
charged with a violation of state law, the murder of an eleven-year-old
girl with whom he had been playing a few hours prior to the discovery
of her body. Reversing the lower court's opinion which affirmed an
adjudication based on a preponderance of the evidence, the court held:
[I]t would not be consonant with due process or equal pro-
tection to grant allegedly delinquent juveniles the same pro-
cedural rights that protect adults charged with crimes, while
depriving these rights or their full efficacy by allowing a find-
134. United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957) ; In re Wylie, 231
A.2d 81 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Bryant v.
Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) ; In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503
(1943); In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1963); People v. Lewis,
260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932) ; State v. Thomasson,
154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955) ; State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 1,
245 P. 409 (1926). Contra, In re Madick, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931) ; Jones v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946). The reasons for applying this standard
are referred to in State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 340, 153 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1958):
It is an informal hearing through the medium of Juvenile Court to determine
whether the child needs the intervention of the state as guardian and protector
of his person. This is obviously to do away with the usual and customary ceremony
and procedure of a court trial in order to surround the child with an atmosphere of
friendliness and goodwill rather than one of hostility and fault-finding.
135. See note 7 supra. The petitioner argued that the "probable cause" standard has
nothing to do with guilt; that it describes the quantum of evidence necessary to justify
arrest, search, or detention for trial; and that it does not even amount to the "preponder-
ance of evidence" necessary for proof of a fact in a civil case. Brief for Petitioner, In re
Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
136. The consequences to the life, liberty and good name of the accused from a
conviction of crime may be much more serious than the effects of a judgment in a
civil case. Accordingly, it is just and reasonable to require a greater degree of con-
fidence by the trier in the truth of the charge in a criminal than in a civil case.
This demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently
expressed from ancient times .... C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 321, p. 681 (1954).
137. Brief for Petitioner 42-54, In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
138. See note 134 supra.
139. 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967). See also United States v. Costanzo, -F.2d-
(4th Cir. 1968).
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ing of delinquency upon a lesser standard of proof than that
required to sustain a criminal conviction. 4°
One would probably be inclined to pass over the statement as
renegade were it not for the fact that Urbasek was decided in the state
that gave birth to the juvenile court concept. But the decision should
not be construed as tolling a death knell for the juvenile court system.
The Illinois court properly emphasized that the unique benefits that are
derived from the special dispositional processes under the system will
not be diluted by the changes made at the adjudicatory stage. The
proposition is simply that when the same or even greater curtailment of
freedom may attach to a finding of delinquency as to a criminal con-
viction, the minor should not be deprived of a standard of proof "dis-
tilled by centuries of experience as a safeguard for adults.''
B. Trial by Jury
Whittington argued- that he had been denied a fair trial by an
impartial trier of fact,' 42 and further, that he was entitled to a trial
by jury if he so desired . 4  He asserted that trial by jury historically is
the safest method of determining whether or not the person accused
has, in fact, committed the act charged. 144 The arbitrariness denounced
in Kent and Gault would be further prevented by the presence of an
unprejudiced cross-section of the community.
In the absence of a statute specifically providing for a jury trial
in a juvenile delinquency hearing, 45 the proposition has been well-
140. Id. at -, 232 N.E.2d at 719. See also the statement of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-342, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946):
The judgment against a youth that he is delinquent is a serious reflection upon
his character and habits. The stain is not removed merely because the statute
says no judgment in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a conviction for
crime or so considered. The stigma of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It
hurts his self-respect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its
ugly head to destroy his opportunity for advancement, and blast his ambition
to build up a character and reputation entitling him to the esteem and respect of
his fellow man ...Guilt should be proven by evidence which leaves no reasonable
doubt.
141. In re Urbasek, 38 Il. 2d at -, 232 N.E.2d at 720 (1967). See also United States v.
Costanzo, -F.2d- (4th Cir. 1968) ("No verbal manipulation or use of a benign label can
convert a four-year commitment following conviction into a civil proceeding.").
142. The petitioner asserted that the juvenile court judge participated-personally and
through his official arm, the probation officer-in the investigative and accusatory process
and had ex parte access to the facts prior to the adjudicative stage. Brief for Petitioner at
57, In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
143. Brief for Petitioner at 64, In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
144. Id. at 66:
The law has established this tribunal because it believed that, from its numbers,
made of their selection, and the fact that the jurors came from all classes of society,
they are better calculated to judge motives (and) weigh possibilities ... than any
single man, however pure, wise and eminent he may be.
People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 27 (1868).
145. See Ex parte Norris, 268 P.2d 302 (Okla. Crim. 1954) (child could waive right
to jury trial); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
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settled that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial.14 6 The courts
have reasoned that since the juvenile hearing is civil in nature and since
the child is charged with delinquency and not a crime, a jury is not
required. However, some courts have held that when a juvenile is charged
with a specific crime, as a basis for a delinquency adjudication, he may
demand that his guilt or innocence be determined by a jury.'47 While
some recent cases have reiterated the nonexistence of a right to jury
trial in the aftermath of Gault,48 a few jurisdictions have broken away
from the previous position, using Gault as their banner. 49
Interestingly, the trend toward recognizing jury trial in juvenile
proceedings is growing despite authoritative recommendations against
the formality it would necessarily bring to the juvenile court. 50 In
Nieves v. United States,'' for example, a federal district court held
that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 5 2 is unconstitutional insofar
as it denies a jury trial to an accused juvenile delinquent charged with
violating a federal criminal statute:
[W]e read Gault to require the availability of that right [to
jury trial] in any federal juvenile proceeding in which a youth
is faced with incarceration for the commission of an act al-
leged to be a violation of federal law. 5 '
The latest statement of the Supreme Court on the right to jury trial
lends some support to the application of that right to juvenile proceed-
ings. In Duncan v. Louisiana'5 4 the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which,
were they to be tried in a federal court, would come within the sixth
amendment's guarantee. 5 This right, the Court noted, must be recog-
146. See cases collected in Annot. 100 A.L.R.2d 1242 (1965). See also Wilson v. Cough-
lin, 147 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa 1966); In re Elmore, 222 A.2d 255 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966). But see
United States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Comm. 1959).
147. State ex Tel Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952); See also cases
cited in Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1242, 1245 (1965).
148. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 70, 234 A.2d 9, 17 (1967):
The institution of the jury trial in juvenile court, while not materially contributing
to the fact-finding function, would seriously limit the court's ability to function in
this unique manner, and would result in a sterile procedure which could not vary
to meet the needs of delinquent children.
149. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1967) (construing state statute as
not prohibitive of trial by jury); In re Rindell, 36 U.S.L.W. 2468 (R.I. Fain. Ct. Jan. 10,
1968). See Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1968) (trial by jury
afforded by statute).
150. The TAsK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME which
augmented the 1967 report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice noted at p. 38: "There is much to support the implicit judgment by
these states that trial by jury is not crucial to a system of juvenile justice." See also Paul-
sen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 559 (1957).
151. 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964).
153. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
154. 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968).
155. Id. at 1447. See also Bloom v. Illinois, 88 S. Ct. 1477 (1968), where the Court
applied a right to jury trial for a contempt punished by a two year prison term.
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nized by the states as part of their obligation to extend due process to
all persons within their jurisdiction.' The Court recognized benefits of
the jury system and the evils which it is designed to lessen, if not
eliminate:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gives him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge.' 57
Trial by jury would no doubt bring substantial difficulties to the
juvenile court. 5 ' No longer would the informal atmosphere prevail. No
longer would the child be judicially coddled. Formal, rigid procedures
would ultimately be necessary. There would undoubtedly be a prosecu-
tor who would present a case against and not entirely in the interest of
the child.
However, these obvious drawbacks may be outweighed by the
benefits to be derived from the integrity of the court proceedings when
based on a violation of law. Perhaps a trial by jury and the necessary
procedures incident thereto would impress upon the juvenile community
the seriousness of deviant behavior.'59 Furthermore, the child would not
be forced to accept a trial by jury. Rather, the form of the proceedings
would depend upon his choice. Ignoring all this, however, the overriding
benefit obtainable is the option of having the same fact-finding process
applied to the commission of the same violation of law, regardless of
whether the individual is a child or an adult.
C. Miranda and the Juvenile
Drawing upon the spirit of the Gault decision, counsel in Whitting-
ton argued that the admission of statements to law enforcement officials
on the night of the discovery of Mrs. Willard's body,160 contravened the
principles laid down in Miranda v. Arizona.''
Although the Court in Gault clearly limited its holdings to the ad-
judicative stage, counsel sought to extend the policy considerations to
156. The Court applied this to serious criminal cases. While not attempting to define
what a serious offense is, the Court did say:
It is sufficient for our purposes to hold that a crime punishable by two years in
prison is, based on past standards in this country, a serious crime and not a petty
offense. Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1454 (1968).
A juvenile in a case such as Gault or Whittington might well argue that commitment to an
institution for minority when based upon a violation of law is a "serious criminal offense."
157. 88 Sp. Ct. 1444, 1451 (1968).
158. For a report on an interesting facet of trial by jury see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, Teen-Age Juries, 12 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 305
(1966).
159. In fact, there is authority for the psychological proposition that formalism may be
of positive benefit for the child. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
160. Brief for Petitioner at 76, In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
161. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the pre-hearing interrogation as well. The Court had emphasized re-
peatedly that admissions and confessions of juveniles require great cau-
tion. Furthermore, the same fears which cast doubt upon the reliability
of confessions by children in court16 arise with greater intensity in a
pre-hearing interview conducted without the presence of counsel.' 63
Substantial authority supports the position taken by Whittington.
For example, the Children's Bureau of the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare has recommended that before the
child is interviewed, he and his parents should be informed of his right
to have legal counsel present and to refuse to answer questions. This
procedure, the Bureau emphasizes, is even more important when prose-
cution in an adult criminal court is a possibility. At the time of the
interview it usually is not known whether or not the juvenile court will
waive its jurisdiction. Therefore, all the procedural safeguards in the
criminal law should be followed.
6 4
Of course, the argument against this position is that the child
should not be encouraged to hide his mistakes, but rather to purge his
conscience. This was, in fact, a major tenet of the previous juvenile
court philosophy-the first step in the rehabilitative process.'65 How-
ever, when balanced against the possibilities of coercion, the noble aim
of purgation shrinks in importance:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the
techniques of persuasion cannot be otherwise than under com-
pulsion to speak. 66
At least one enlightened juvenile court provides against the trans-
gression of the Miranda guarantees. When the child is interviewed, the
violation of law with which he is charged is clearly stated. He is advised
of the seriousness of the matter, his right to have counsel present and
his privilege against self-incrimination. After making any statement, both
162. 387 U.S. at 45, 51-52. See also The Effect of the Miranda Case on Confessions in
the Juvenile Court, 5 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 79 (1967). See also In re Rust, 53 Misc. 2d 51, 278
N.Y.S.2d 333 (Family Ct. 1967); In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct.
1967); Choate v. State, 425 S.W.2d 706 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1968), for cases applying
Miranda to juvenile proceedings.
163. The petitioner relied upon the following statement in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49, 54 (1962):
[A] 14-year old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception
of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police. That is
to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and
understanding of the consequences of the question and answers being recorded
and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights.
164. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, STANDARDS
FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 49 (1966).
165. See statement of the Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 51.
166. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1965). See State v. Piche, 442 P.2d 632
(Wash. 1968).
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the child and the parent or guardian are required to sign the statement,
in the presence of a witness." 7
Clearly such a procedure does not hamper the orderly machinery
of the court process. Rather, it eliminates any claim of arbitrariness and,
at the same time, impresses the child with the significance of his act.
D. Right to Bail
The final major legal argument presented by Whittington was that
the denial of pre-hearing release to juveniles charged with a violation of
law was contrary to due process and equal protection. 68
Perhaps the decision in the leading case of Trimble v. Stone 6 9
best explains the position of those authorities recognizing a constitutional
right to bail for juveniles. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, while accepting that a juvenile proceeding is not
criminal, refused to recognize a distinction in the possible result of the
proceeding. Even though a child committed to the National Training
School for Boys is the object of the Government's paternalistic spirit,
the court reasoned, the commitment is nevertheless punishment and a dep-
rivation of liberty. Thus, the constitutional right to bail must be applied
to a juvenile court proceeding based on a violation of law.
167. The court referred to is the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade
County, Florida. The substance of the form is reproduced in part, below:
ADVICE OF RIGHTS
It has been reported to the Juvenile Court that you have been involved in (state
clearly the law violation).
This is a serious matter and I must advise you of certain rights you have in this
Court. You have a RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY that
you employ. If you and your parents are unable to pay for an attorney, the
COURT WILL APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT YOU WITHOUT
COST. Do you understand?
You have a PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. This means that
you do not have to make any statement or admission by speaking or in writing that
would in any way involve or incriminate you in this case or in any other law
violation. Do you understand?
You have a RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT and not make any statement, and if
you choose to remain silent this will not be held against you at this time or at any
court case. Do you understand?
If you choose to make a statement, anything you say, or any admission you make
in writing can, and will, be used against you in court. Do you understand?
You have a RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AT THIS TIME
and to consult with an attorney prior to making any statement or admission in
writing, and to assist you in making any decision concerning your rights in this
case. Do you understand?
Is there any portion of this statement that you would like for me to read again?
Having been advised of your rights, do you wish to proceed at this time without
consulting an attorney, or without having an attorney present?
168. Brief for Petitioner at 86, In re Whittington, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968).
169. 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). See also State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d
211 (1943); Smith v. McCrary, 1 Crim. L. Rep. 2153 (Ky. Cir. Ct. May 26, 1967) and Ex
parte Osborne, 127 Tex. Crim. 136, 75 S.W.2d 265 (1934), holding that a child in juvenile
court has a right to bail.
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Those who argue against applying bail to the juvenile court assert
that a child who is in trouble may need care immediately. Care is not
provided by a release from custody. Indeed, discharge to parents may
not be appropriate or wise in certain situations since the parents may
be the source of or contribute to the child's problem. 170
One need only reflect upon the empirical data compiled"' to appre-
ciate that release may be extremely detrimental in certain instances. 72
When such circumstances are recognized, it would appear to be con-
sistent with the juvenile court concept to issue not only a petition of
delinquency but also a petition of dependency, alleging the home condi-
tions. If the allegations are true, then the child, dependent upon the
state for proper care, should not be subject to pre-hearing release. 7
Absent the above-mentioned situation, however, it seems patently
unfair to deny a juvenile the same right to bail that is afforded an adult,
when both may be charged with the same criminal act. Bail is based
upon the presumption of innocence and the desire to give an individual
the opportunity to prepare a defense unhampered. It also serves to
prevent the infliction of punishment prior to an adjudication in a court
of law consistent with due process. Unless the presumption of innocence
begins only at a certain age limit, unless it is not important that a child
prepare a defense, and unless it is fair that a child be punished prior
to a finding of guilt, bail should be applicable to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.' 74
VI. CONCLUSION
What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet.'
7 5
This philosophical observation eloquently crystallizes what is, in
this author's opinion, the ultimate issue facing the courts. Labels are
only meaningless when rights are not dependent on them. Yet, for the
want of a name, a label, or a category within which to define the rights
of juveniles and the correlative duties of the courts, the system now
170. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Mnqn. L. REv. 547, 552 (1967).
See also Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963) ; and State ex rel. Peaks v.
Allamon, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 403, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio App. 1952), holding that there is no
constitutional right to bail in a juvenile court proceeding.
171. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
172. Indeed, release of adult offenders before trial may be extremely detrimental, both
to society and to the individual. Yet this has never been a sufficient rationale to overcome
the presumption of innocence. See Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
173. See In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952) (proceeding to
declare minor ward of juvenile court is not criminal, and is not subject to bail provisions of
state constitution).
174. See also Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELX. L.Q. 387
(1961) ; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957) ; Note, 29
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 583 (1961).
175. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, scene I.
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hangs in limbo. What is ignored is that criminal law is one thing, civil
law is quite another. "Let us not deal with a criminal matter in a civil
way, with the result that we have a 'hodge podge' of nothingness.'
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When a child is charged with a violation of law, when the goal of
the fact-finding process is to determine whether or not he committed the
act, and when the result may be confinement, how can it be denied that
the process is criminal in nature?
Recognition of this self-evident proposition will not destroy the
real value of the juvenile court concept. It will not deter benevolence or
repel understanding. Once it is decided that the child has violated some
law, then, in the dispositional stage, armed with all the experience of
that office, the judge can determine what can best be done "to save him
from a downward career.' 17 7 It is at this point, that the state has an
opportunity to contribute substantially as parens patriae in the best
interests of the child.
This system cannot work, however, unless the alternatives of
treatment are substantial. The taxpayer must be made to appreciate the
tremendous amounts of human talent and manpower which fall irre-
trievably into the institutional crevices known as "Boy's Schools." The
alarming rise in youth crime and the disappointing recidivism dramati-
cally point up the need for workable youth centers, filled with psycholo-
gists and social workers, and devoid of the atmosphere which propels
delinquents toward death row.
The juvenile courts, staffed for the most part by dedicated and
qualified individuals, must now be bolstered by both consistent law and
substantial monies. If they are, the juvenile court traditionalist and the
due process zealot can both achieve noble ends.
What's in a name? It can mean that, in the interest of society, we
provide the best of both worlds for our troubled young.
176. In re Rindell, 36 U.S.L.W. 2468 (R.I. Family Ct. Jan. 10, 1968).
177. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-120 (1909).
